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Abstract 
The U.S. economy experienced a dramatic rise in the price of owner occupied housing during 
1999-2007, and then a precipitous decline from 2007 through 2009. In this paper we utilize data 
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) during 1999–2009 to study first the factors 
and borrowing decisions which were related to the run-up and then to see how these diverse 
positions in owner-occupied housing related to the subsequent difficulties and mortgage distress 
as of 2009. Our research shows that much of the rise and subsequent difficulties were 
concentrated among younger and less educated homeowners, and that the difficulties were also 
concentrated in selected real estate markets where home owners were allocating a substantial 
share of their income to debt service and other home related outlays such as taxes, utilities, and 
insurance. This pattern of high costs to support a housing position is interpreted as the result of a 
speculative price run-up supported by the joint decisions of the homeowners and their lenders. In 
this process the older population took on more mortgage debt than in prior years and may now 




Introduction and Motivation 
 
    Owner-occupied housing is the major asset in many households’ portfolios and across a wide 
span of the life cycle. Housing wealth is an important determinant of consumption and saving behavior 
of households and is often correlated with savings and better overall financial management.  A family’s 
investment decision in housing may have profound implications for all those within it and for the 
economy at large.  Investment in housing is often financed through a mortgage contract, a feature 
crucial for understanding the causes and consequences of the recent crises. In particular, the downturn 
in housing prices and associated delinquencies on mortgages are generally considered to be the major 
cause of the crisis in credit markets that subsequently spilled into the other sectors of the economy.  
        
     Housing services are the consumption dimension, but on the financial side recent research (Hurst and 
Stafford, 2004; Cooper, 2009) supports own home as primarily playing a collateral or liquidity role – in 
contrast to the wealth effects found for non-pension holdings of stocks (Juster, Lupton, Smith and 
Stafford, 2006). In the Hurst-Stafford framework there are two motivations for exercising the option to 
refinance a mortgage.  There is a traditional financial motivation to realize a net worth gain and possibly 
an asset reallocation when an existing mortgage can be refinanced at a lower interest rate. A second 
motivation for exercising the refinancing option is to tap into equity and ‘borrow up’ to support 
consumption. Exercising this consumption option can lead to refinancing to a higher rate of interest.   A 
third motivation to refinance can be to cover cash flow requirements from home ownership which are 
induced by interest, tax and utility costs. This refinancing can be thought of as a liquidity option. That is, 
refinancing to a position in housing which embodies a wider set of and higher level of costs. These are 
costs beyond those related to normal predicted consumption, based on income and family composition. 
This speculative financing based on expected appreciation appears to have played a major role in the 




    Use of refinancing or holding a larger mortgage can be thought of as an investment or speculative 
motivation. Related to liquidity, this tapping into perceived equity gains from rising home prices can 
clearly be risky as changes in the family balance sheet are mixing with expense flows. In short, during 
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the boom, families and their lenders more often took on a jointly speculative position leading to 
increased cash flow demands to cover housing costs – a potential motivation for refinancing as home 




The decisions to invest in housing and hold a substantial mortgage are usually associated with 
younger households (Flavin and Yamashita, 2002) as part of a life-cycle approach to consumption and 
asset management (Campbell and Viciera, 2002; Deaton, 2001), but the housing boom of 1999-2005 
induced many of those 60 years or older to hold more housing and have greater mortgage debt than for 
prior cohorts. In 1986, 20.4 percent of owners age 65-79 held a mortgage on their home, and by 2005 
this had increased to 35.8 percent.  A study by Apgar and Di (2006) reports that mortgage debt owed by 
older households nearly quadrupled between 1989 and 2001. In 2001, after accounting for inflation, the 
typical household headed by someone 65 or older had $44,000 in mortgage debt, compared with 
$12,000 in 1989 (Apgar and Di, 2006).  Among the factors contributing to increased home debt among 
elderly are changes in the tax code in 1986 and the increase in real estate property values in the 1990s. 
Additionally, reports in the press suggest that equity-rich, cash poor elderly homeowners in need to pay 
off debt, cover medical expenses, or help out the kids had been an attractive target for predatory 
mortgage lenders. 
 
Whether this increased housing debt by the elderly presents a problem for their financial well 
being ultimately depends on how much wealth and income older borrowers have. One aspect is clear, 
however. Even at the lower mortgage rates, by 2007 the mortgage debt payments as well as other 
expenses for insurance and taxes had become a rising share of family income compared to earlier 
periods. This was most pronounced in specific urban markets. With  rising home expenses and a greater 
cost of home debt servicing, elderly homeowners, many of whom are on fixed or limited incomes, may 
find themselves in a financially constrained or even distressed liquidity situation should there be a 
reversal in home prices.  
                                                          
1 Another type of liquidity problem can arise when the price and induced tax increases lead to cash flow problems 
as in Florida and California. This sounds like an Adam Smith difference between value in use and value in exchange 
or a mixture of price of housing services versus financial dimensions! 
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A traditional source of financial help has been help from relatives living outside the family unit, 
particularly across generations. Elderly parents finding themselves in financially distressed situations 
could turn to their adult children for help. But more often, it has generally been that elderly parents, 
financially more secure than their young adult children, are the source of help. In the recent crises with 
the rise in unemployment and collateral losses in the owner-occupied housing market, many families are 
experiencing financial distress and face the risk of foreclosure. As a result, financial well being of the 
elderly can be negatively affected as younger adult family members are increasingly seeking help from 
their parents. The potential support from elders may be limited, if these families are themselves 
constrained via prior housing commitments, and any implicit sharing or insurance arrangements will not 
work. One perspective on family finances is that of an informal or implicit insurance arrangement.2
 
 In 
times of need intra-family transfers (across separate households) can stabilize economic well-being and 
attenuate economic stress. 
Here we explore some of the questions outlined above by  using  the new data being collected 
as of spring – fall of 2009 in the long-standing, nationally representative Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) of now approximately 9,000 families and 24,000 individuals living within these families. 
What makes the PSID data particularly well-suited to address these questions from a household 
perspective? It is the rich set of variables traditionally collected, including those on housing and wealth 
holdings and basic geospatial measures.  These measures, together with the new questions on 
foreclosure and mortgage distress added in 2009 and on fixed/adjustable mortgage rates added in 2007 
and 2009, are now available as a supplemental file on the PSID website.  
                                                          




II. Net Worth and Emerging Patterns of Home Mortgage Participation and Asset Ownership 
 
    Here we present basic patterns of household net worth for those headed by a person age 65 and 
older and of those at midlife course, age 40-49, along with age profiles of participation on the home 
mortgage market over time.  In Table 1 it can be seen that over the period, 2001-2007, those age 65 and 
older experienced a substantial rise in the constant dollar value of their net worth. The median value of 
net worth rose modestly but was generally quite stable. The rise in net worth of families age 65-79 has 
been documented elsewhere.3
 
  The younger or midlife group age 40-49, which could be thought of as 
including  the ‘younger generation,’ and likely to seek help from the elders in times of need also had 
substantially more net worth as of 2007 compared to 2001. On the other hand, financial net worth, cash 
or that which can be readily converted into cash, shows no growth at the mean or median, 2001-2007, 
for those 65 or older, and, in fact, declined modestly.  
       For those age 40-49 the mean financial wealth shows no clear improvement, 2001-2007, and the 
median financial wealth shows a low and declining real value, 2001-2007.  Of some concern is that 
moving toward 2007 the liquid financial net worth is declining, especially relative to overall net worth, 
and is persistently low and declining, especially at the median, for those families age 40-49. The median 
for this age group was persistently under $10,000 ($2007). As financial vicissitudes arise, these midlife 
course families have limited liquid reserves to deal with negative financial shocks4
                                                          
3 The average net worth of those age 65-79 more than doubled in constant dollars from 1984-2001 and the income 
relative to Census Needs also rose strongly for this group, especially for those in better health. See Grafova, 
McGonagle and Stafford, 2005 “Functioning and Well-Being in the Third Age,1986-2001,” in The Crown of Life: 
Dynamics of the Early Post-Retirement Years (Jacquelyn B. James and Paul Wink, eds.) , 2006. 
.  Moreover, the ‘First 
National Bank of Granddad’ had not increased its overall reserves nor the reserves relative to overall 
portfolio value.  
4 The 2007 value of non-collateralized debt, especially burdensome in a cash flow crisis, shows that of the families 
who hold any had a total balance averaging $21,500. See ‘Trends in Household Wealth Dynamics, 2005-2007.’ 




                                                     Table 1 
 Household Net Worth5
 
 (NW) and Financial Net Worth (FNW), 2001-2007 ($2007) 
AGE   2001     2003    2005      2007 
 
65+               
 NW Mean    463.5    486.4       488.5     575.5 
 NW Median    218.5    204.3     208.1     237.1 
 FNW Mean    238.8    255.0     222.8     237.7 
  FNW Median    48.7      48.4       42.5       42.0 
40-49     
  NW Mean     267.8    257.4    306.5    367.2 
  NW Median      82.3     73.8      81.7     90.0 
  FNW Mean    123.5   103.5   121.7   100.1 
  FNW Median      9.7      8.0      8.2        8.0 
 
    Turning to home ownership, we present age profiles based on the full weighted sample of the PSID, 
1979 to 2007. Figure 1 has the proportion of mortgage holding of home owners by age group, 25-34, 35-
49, 50-64 and 65 and older. The top line is for those headed by a family age 25-34, and just below are 
the families age 35-49. Both show the persistently high rates for those families headed by a 25-49 year 
old. The middle line is for families headed by a 50-64 year old. About half of these families held a 
mortgage from 1979 to the early 1990’s and then the share of homeowners with a mortgage rose to 
about rose to about 70 percent after 1999. 
                                                          
5 These are the same definitions as used in “Wealth Dynamics of American Families, 1984-1994,” (Erik Hurst, Ming 
Ching Luoh and Frank P. Stafford), Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1998:I, p. 276-337. However, as of 1999 




    The lowest line is for families headed by an individual age 65 or older. Over the period we can see a 
rise for older families from under 20% with a mortgage to about 30% by 2007. Another reference point 
is the dip in mortgage holding in the early 1990’s, a period with high mortgage rates, followed by a 
rebound in mortgage holding as rates came down in the mid and later 1990’s.  
 
   
 
                                                                   Figure 1  
                      Percent of Home-owning Families Holding a Mortgage by Age of Homeowner 
                                     
 
Over this time period second mortgages were in the set of financing arrangements. As shown in    
8 
 
                                                                            Figure 2 
                                    Second Mortgage Holding by Age of Homeowner 
                                             
 
Figure 2, the pattern of second mortgages is quite erratic, but has an upward trend for those 35-64 up to 
the decline in mortgage rates in the mid-1990’s and also the advent of expedited mortgage processing 
from that time forward. The use of a second mortgage makes sense for those wishing to draw out home 
equity when prevailing rates are high. They can keep a low rate on their first mortgage and pay the 
higher rate on a smaller, incremental borrowing. Despite the growth of refinancing choices, the second 
series also suggests the use of second mortgages was on the rise during 2003-2007. A third look is the 
cash flow dimension to homeownership. This is illustrated for 1993-2007 in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 
                                            50th percentile of Housing Cost Relative to Family Income 
 
Aside from a 2005-2007 modest attenuation for those 65 and older, we can see a general rise in the 
median share of family income going housing payments in 2001-2007. And the rise is steeper for the 
youngest group.  
 
One related measure of housing and mortgage contract position is a micro level version of the 
Debt Service Ratio (DSR) maintained by the Federal Reserve Board. This aggregate index shows the 
upward movement in cash flow burden of mortgages up through 2007. At the micro level the PSID data 
show both a rising and dispersed ratio of mortgage debt to family income (DSR). Holding a high DSR is 
one measure of a family’s housing risk. The expectation of additional future increases in home prices can 
be the motivation for enduring a higher cash flow burden. Expanding this to include all other housing 
related payments (taxes insurance, utilities,…) relative to family income, housing payments to income 
(HPI), provides another measure, as set out in Figure 3. 
 
      These are payments for interest on the first and second  mortgage, and with rising house prices come 
rising real estate taxes, and along with utilities, the cash flow going into owner occupied housing was on 
the rise.  Retrospectively, we may want to conclude that these were evident patterns of ‘excess’ in the 
housing and mortgage market. At the time of the upswing, observers could think  –  we are seeing the 
effect of the Baby Boom with a growth of families at their peak of income, and  this is the early part of 
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the cohort, and with those born toward the end (1964) of the boom, we will see a continued strong 
demand for housing6
 
. Edward Gramlich (2007) noted that one aspect of the 1995-2005 U.S. housing 
pattern was higher ownership rates with a wider demographic distribution. The growth of persistent 
ownership, 1999-2005, is illustrated in Appendix Table A1 below. Some families persisted as renters and 
others, in addition to being new or continuing owners, took on very risky positions. Specifically, they 
(and their lenders) chose variable rate mortgages or ones with a balloon repayment and a short horizon, 
and the PSID panel data show this and other aspects of housing and mortgage decisions.  
       The intergenerational structure of the PSID supports a unique analysis of ownership patterns.  To 
begin this analysis we selected all the families headed by an individual age 65 or older as of 2007. Then 
we determined if and how many children of the head and\or wife, under age 65, were also present in 
the 2007 sample. If none were found, the 65+ family was dropped from the subsample. In the other 
cases there were sometimes two or more adult child families under age 65, and occasionally there was 
one family headed by an individual under age 65 with two parental families with a head age 65 or older.   
We used the set of families with a head under age 65 as the reference point and if more than one 65+  
family was present in 2007 we assigned the parental 65+ measures to each.  See Table 2. 
 
      
     Table 2.  The Ownership Patterns of those Age 65 and Older and Their Adult Children,  2007 
Child\Parent   Parent Owns Parent Does Not Own      Total 
   Child  Owns         63.8% 
       (969) 
             12.77% 
              (193) 
        76.60% 
      (1162) 
   Child Does Not Own         14.3% 
       (217) 
               9.2% 
              (140) 
        23.5%   
        (375) 
   Total        78.1%  
       (1186) 
               21.9% 
               (333) 
      100.0% 
      (1519) 
 
       This sample, as well as the sample of adult children with more than one 65+ parental family to ‘lean 
on’, is not large enough for separate analysis. This raises the more empirically important  topic of 
                                                          
6 In Appendix Table 1 we show the share of homeowners by year in the different age groups form the weighted 
PSID data. 
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multiple adult children potentially being connected to a single 65+ family – essentially a multiple 
dependence – potentially creating a greater demand in the insurance role for the 65+ family. The across 
generation case counts as of 2007 and their home ownership status is set out in Table 2.  There is a 
higher overall ownership in this subgroup of intergenerational pairs than in the full population (about 
77% v 67%), and there is a modest positive correlation in ownership across the generations, even 
though the child generation includes many who are younger and less likely to own. Whether this modest 
intergenerational ownership correlation implies a strong family risk position will depend not just on 
ownership per se, but the mortgage arrangements and other aspects of the families’ assets and cash 
flow position. We now turn to the mortgage positions and their correlation. 
 
III. The Presence of NTM’s and the Cash Flow Position 
 
        What measures are clear indicators of a risky housing position prior to the declines in the market?  
A widely used measure has been loan to value ratios. The existing PSID data show that the 2005 loan to 
value ratios as a measure of the homeowner’s leverage position are problematic. A high LTV, well above 
a ‘safe’ level of 80% or more in home equity at the point of mortgage settlement, was often driven 
downward by rapid home price increases, producing an ex post ‘safe’ mortgage.  By 2007 the normal 
strong relationship between permanent income and the house value (not shown here) became much 
weaker. Then going forward to 2009, we will see some of the ex ante ‘safe’ mortgages become ‘under 
water’ with the rapidly declining home values, 2007-2009. By 2009 most of the acute declines had 
ended, and the net equity position ex post can be observed as an outcome. Which families are these  
who are experiencing this ‘collateral damage’? How strongly does the 2007 housing payments to 
income, likely a better ex ante risk measure, relate to such an outcome? 
 
      To define non-traditional mortgages or NTM’s, we first consider the families as of 2007. One 




                                                                 Figure 4 
                      Adjustable Rate Mortgage as the Primary Loan by Year of Origin 
 
 
From Figure 4 above the share of the 2007 mortgages which were variable rate mortgages is rising from 
1997 to 2007. The rise is even stronger given the reports were from a March to December field period in 
2007, and that the 2001-2004 and 1997–2001 are for 4 year intervals. Also the share of ARMS is highly 
concentrated in certain states as can be seen from the following Figure 5. Here, California, Florida and 
Arizona are states in which there was a strong run up in the Case-Shiller repeat home sales index – and 
had the cities leading the parade of declining prices from mid-2007 to mid 2009 (Phoenix, Miami, Tampa 
Bay, San Diego, Los Angeles and San Francisco). By comparison, Texas shows a far lower rate of 
refinancing and Dallas shows an attenuated price run up and a far lower subsequent decline in home 
prices, 2007-2009. 
 
     One interpretation is that refinancing was part of speculative leveraging to participate in the housing 
market concentrated in certain urban housing markets. So, if true, this is consistent with speculative 
refinancing as a third motive to the simple taxonomy of the financial and consumption options 
refinancing model of Hurst and Stafford. The refinancing here could support the cash flow needed to 
hold the asset during an anticipated price run up. Under these conditions refinancing during the housing 
boom represents a type of NTM, here NTM2. Figure 5 shows the patterns of refinancing by state, and 
the states with large increases in the Case-Shiller Index for the major urban areas showed the greatest 




                                                                         Figure 5 
                                    Percent Refinancing First Mortgage by State, 2004-2007 
 
 A higher incidence of refinancing among those with less education was also a pattern. 
 
                                                                         Figure 6 




      Such refinancing was quite common among those familes with a head age 65 or older. Homeowners 
in the age cohort 55-64 had the highest percentage of ARMs. Income is negatively correlated with 
ARMs, indicating that the higher the income, the less likely a homeowner obtained an ARM.   
 
 
                                                                Figure 7 
                               Percent with Second Mortgage by State, 2007 
 
 
      According to Figure 7, homeowners residing in California and Arizona were most likely to obtain a 
second mortgage for their homes. In contrast only 0.7% of mortgages in Pennsylvania were second 
mortgages, which was the lowest percentage among all the states. The trend in second mortgages 
parallels that of ARMs in regards to the year of second mortgage origin. The majority of homeowners 
obtained their second mortgages either before 1997 or between the years 2005 and 2007. In contrast to 
ARMs, there is a negative correlation with age and second mortgages. While only 1.2% of 65 and older 
homeowners obtained a second mortgage, 8.1% of homeowners younger than 35 years old had a 
second mortgage.  
     Only 3.6% of homeowners with an educational attainment level of a high school degree or less 
obtained a second mortgage. The higher the family unit’s income, the less likely they were to obtain a 
second mortgage. By contrast, those refinancing mortgages were somewhat more likely to be those 
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with higher incomes. Those who obtained their first mortgage between years 2001 and 2004 were more 
likely to refinance, with 50.0% of mortgages obtained from 2001 to 2004 being refinanced and 43.0% of 
mortgages obtained from 2005 to 2007 being refinanced.     
       As we saw in Figure 3 above there was a general rise in the share of income going to support 
homeowner expenses. In addition many homeowners had refinanced in the near term, especially in 
selected states. Then given the positions of families with respect to housing as of 2007, how important 
are 2007 HPI (housing payments relative to family income) and other 2007 mortgage measures in 
predicting the various outcomes in 2009 – foreclosure, falling behind in payments, mortgage 
modification, and expecting to fall behind in the next 12 months? 
 
IV. Outcomes, 2007-2009   
   
       Here we show how these ex ante risk positions played out as the housing market and the wider 
economy deteriorated, 2007-2009. For this we have used the early files in 2009 which measure a set of 
mortgage distress indicators, or adverse outcomes. These range from no observed problems to modest 
reported risk of payment problems in the next 12 months, to having fallen behind substantially in 
making payments, the need to modify the mortgage because of payment problems (not normal 
refinancing), and then actual foreclosure since 2007.  Specifically, we have explored the following 
outcomes: 
1 Foreclosure, 2007-2009. The case count here is based on those who report being in foreclosure 
as of the 2009 interview (A27F3) plus those who report a foreclosure in the 2001-2009 time 
window ( A37F1). To provide a measure of recent foreclosures this overall group gets reduced 
by 2 factors. First are the foreclosures, 2001-2006 (from A37F2), which occurred before we 
collected information on whether the mortgage rate was variable and other aspects of the 
mortgage. Another group is excluded  because the property foreclosed upon was not their 
primary residence (A37F5) (1=own home, 2= investment property, 3= vacation home/condo, 7 = 
other specify). 
2 Falling behind. This is based on the variable (A27F1)    1= yes, 5 = no from the pdf of the 
questionnaire. There are no values of ‘ 8 or 9’. Here  1=1, and all others = 0. 
3 Next 12 Months  (A27FOR6) fall behind? 1=very likely, 3 = somewhat likely, 5= not at all likely. 
Here we have an ordered logit with three categories for the dependent variable: 1, 3, and other. 
4 Mortgage Modification ( A24FOR5 (1=yes; 5=no) 1=1, 5 and other = 0. 
5 Under water. Here we have the cases where a dollar value of the home was reported. The 
unfolding bracket cases are likely to create classification problems. The ratio is (for valid dollar 
value of home value on the market  – excluding  bracket range values s and ‘don’t know’s’) the 
sum of (A24MOR1 + A24 MOR2)/A20 = sum of mortgage balances / house value (value of house 
if sold today). This was converted into 1-0 under water =  sum of mortgages/hv > 1.00 or not. 
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    We have developed logistic regression models for outcomes 1-5. The estimates for foreclosures (Table 
3) are limited by the small case counts on recent foreclosures.  Variables showing a relationship to the 
distress measures are age, education, and 2007 share of income allocated to housing payments. 
Consider one 2009 outcome for which we have results. As of the date of the interview in 2009 had the 
family taken steps to have their mortgage modified (see Table 4).   This provides a view on what was 
applied in the other outcome variables in that it has the 2007 variables used to predict the set of 
outcomes as of 2009. The preliminary results indicate – not surprisingly – that having more income and 
fewer family members (higher per capita family income) as of 2007 reduces the probability of falling 
behind. Those who are marred have a higher probability of being behind in payments.7
 
 Also, cities of 
100,000 and larger have an effect (more likely to fall behind). If the head was working as of the date of 
interview in 2007 this reduces the risk of falling behind, more education reduces the risk of falling 
behind, and African Americans are more likely to be falling behind. Related to the intergenerational 
aspect, those over 65 were far less likely to have difficulties – despite the substantial shift to mortgage 
holding by those 65+.   So the older generation may be in a better position to help their adult children.    
        Two interesting results on the financial side are that those on an original mortgage and those who 
financed further back in time are less likely to be behind – consistent with a speculator interpretation.  
Whether a recent refi, Case-Shiller Index (CSI) (dummy codes for rate of decline for the big urban 
markets. 2007-2009), both have substantial effects on the probability of falling behind in mortgage 
payments as of 2009. Including the CSI dummies displaces the effect of city size and region. Further, 
adding house payments to family income as of 2007 (HPI high) generally reduces the CSI relationship for 
the outcomes. The HPI variable, denoted as housing payment ratio <=1, is the ratio of these payments 
relative to 2007 total family income (excluding a few extreme values where the ratio was 1.0 or greater). 
For Table 5 (behind in mortgage payments) and Table 7 (‘under water’) the CSI variable has  a persistent 
effect when HPI is part of the equation.  In Table 4 (mortgage modified) and Table 6 (expect to fall 
behind in the coming 12 months), the effect of the CSI variable is clearly reduced when HPI is added to 
the model. 8
 
  This is summarized in Table 8. 
                                                          
7 Not surprisingly, net worth as of  2007  (excluding housing) has a large negative effect. 
8 The foreclosure questions cover a wider time interval, 2001-2009, but here we wanted to have a dependent 
variable with a time frame parallel to the other measures, 2007-2009. 
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      To review, for Tables 3–6, in each regression, excluding the housing payments dummy generally 
leads to substantially larger and more statistically significant effects for the Case-Shiller Index categories. 
This is consistent with the interpretation that selected urban housing markets were subject to a 
substantial price run-up and that this was reflected in the increased share of family income needed to 
service the debt and other costs associated with home owning. In the context of a speculative run-up, at 
some point few additional, net entrants to the market were present to support the continued price rise. 
Once prices ceased to rise, the motivation to persist as a speculator began to wane on the part of the 
homeowners and the lenders, and the fall was underway. 
 
                                                                Table3  
 








Head is male (0/1)  -0.4654 
 
0.8442 
Age head 25-34 (0/1)  0.4932 
 
1.0377 
Age head 35-49 (0/1)  1.1509 
 
0.7754 
Age head 50-64 (0/1)  1.1473 
 
0.7344 
Black (0/1) 0.4832 
 
0.5839 
Married (0/1)  -0.0697 
 
0.8598 
Less than high school (0/1)  1.2107 
 
0.8872 
High school diploma (0/1)   1.3879* 
 
0.8001 
Some college (0/1) 1.8678** 
 
0.7749 
Family size  0.2706* 
 
0.1499 
Head working now (0/1)  -1.48*** 
 
0.468 
North East (0/1)  -0.632 
 
0.647 
Midwest (0/1)  -0.657 
 
0.581 
South (0/1)  -0.7083 
 
0.604 
Largest city 500,000 or more (0/1)  0.4226 
 
0.7453 
Largest city 100,000-499,999 (0/1)  0.684 
 
0.4587 
Whether Original mortgage (0/1)   0.1169 
 
0.4218 
Year of mortgage origination  -0.00011 
 
0.000596 
Area not in Case-Shiller (0/1)  2.5048 
 
1.7478 
Case-Shiller 07-09 decline >=15% but < 35%  2.6934 
 
1.7975 
Case-Shiller 07-09 decline >=35%  1.9296 
 
1.7618 
Housing  payment ratio  3.8794*** 
 
0.9886 
Summary statistics  
 
   
 N :  3432    
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                                                           Table 4 




Intercept  -3.2418*** 
 
0.5124 
Head is male (0/1)  0.3158 
 
0.2322 
Age head 25-34 (0/1)  0.272 
 
0.2777 
Age head 35-49 (0/1)  0.0536 
 
0.249 
Age head 50-64 (0/1)  -0.2011 
 
0.2383 
Black  (0/1) 0.4164** 
 
0.2069 
Married (0/1)  -0.6653*** 
 
0.2258 
Less than high school (0/1) 0.6325*** 
 
0.2178 
High school diploma (0/1) 0.438*** 
 
0.168 
Some college (0/1) 0.1881 
 
0.1752 
Family size   0.1827*** 
 
0.0544 
Head working now (0/1)  -1.28E-01 
 
1.96E-01 
North East (0/1)  2.51E-01 
 
2.10E-01 
Midwest (0/1)  1.02E-01 
 
1.90E-01 
South (0/1)  -0.1764 
 
0.1924 
Largest city 500,000 or more (0/1)  0.1867 
 
0.2165 
Largest city 100,000-499,999 (0/1)  0.23 
 
0.1523 
Whether Original mortgage (0/1) -0.0185 
 
0.1346 
Year of mortgage origination  0.000032 
 
0.000187 
Area not in Case-Shiller (0/1) -0.2519 
 
0.245 
Case-Shiller 07-09 decline >=15% but < 35% (0/1) -0.5038 
 
0.3106 
Case-Shiller 07-09 decline >=35% (0/1) 0.2261 
 
0.2831 
Housing payment ratio  2.8808*** 
 
0.3997 
Summary statistics  
   N:  2731    
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                                                      Table 5 




Intercept1  -6.9577*** 
 
0.9011 
Head is male (0/1)  -0.6931* 
 
0.3941 
Age head 25-34 (0/1)  1.7338*** 
 
0.5149 
Age head 35-49 (0/1)  1.6251*** 
 
0.4719 
Age head 50-64 (0/1)  1.3632*** 
 
0.4551 
Black (0/1) 0.7323*** 
 
0.2599 
Married (0/1)  -0.0106 
 
0.3952 
Less than high school (0/1) 1.6297*** 
 
0.3139 
High school diploma (0/1) 1.0582*** 
 
0.2748 
Some college (0/1) 0.7718*** 
 
0.2909 
Family size  0.2338*** 
 
0.0699 
Head working now (0/1)  -0.372 
 
0.265 
North East (0/1)  0.220 
 
0.316 
Midwest (0/1)  0.201 
 
0.278 
South (0/1)  0.1276 
 
0.2759 
Largest city 500,000 or more (0/1)  0.6113* 
 
0.3147 
Largest city 100,000-499,999 (0/1)  0.4157* 
 
0.2161 
Whether Original mortgage (0/1) -0.2244 
 
0.1942 
Year of mortgage origination  -0.00004 
 
0.000271 
Area not in Case-Shiller (0/1) 1.10** 
 
0.4913 
Case-Shiller 07-09 decline >=15% but < 35% (0/1) 0.276 
 
0.6018 
Case-Shiller 07-09 decline >=35%  (0/1) 1.2039** 
 
0.5218 
Housing payment ratio 2.9982*** 
 
0.5297 
Summary statistics  
 
   
 N:  2730    
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                                                                    Table 6  
Ordered Logistic Regression of Expectation to Fall Behind on Mortgage Payments in the Next 12 Months 






Intercept1  -5.8647*** 
 
0.4997 
Intercept2  -4.0302*** 
 
0.4851 
Head is male (0/1)  -0.1122 
 
0.2345 
Age head 25-34 (0/1)  1.1501*** 
 
0.3162 
Age head 35-49 (0/1)  1.1811*** 
 
0.2886 
Age head 50-64 (0/1)  1.0468*** 
 
0.2786 
Black  (0/1) 0.4381** 
 
0.1876 
Married (0/1)  -0.3474 
 
0.2282 
Less than high school (0/1) 1.4954*** 
 
0.1968 
High school diploma (0/1) 0.8378*** 
 
0.1618 
Some college (0/1) 0.575*** 
 
0.1695 
Family size  0.252*** 
 
0.0484 
Head working now (0/1)  0.106 
 
0.194 
North East (0/1)  -0.0284 
 
0.204 
Midwest (0/1)  -0.0973 
 
0.182 
South (0/1)  0.2808 
 
0.1722 
Largest city 500,000 or more (0/1)  -0.0932 
 
0.2195 
Largest city 100,000-499,999 (0/1)  0.0631 
 
0.1425 
Whether Original mortgage (0/1) -0.1 
 
0.1251 
Year of mortgage origination  -0.00043*** 
 
0.000145 
Area not in Case-Shiller (0/1) 0.1298 
 
0.2567 
Case-Shiller 07-09 decline >=15% but < 35% (0/1) -0.0494 
 
0.3127 
Case-Shiller 07-09 decline >=35% (0/1) 0.2893 
 
0.2949 
Housing payment ratio  3.1102*** 
 
0.3759 
Summary statistics  
   N :  2716    
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Intercept  -4.277*** 
 
0.676 
Head is male (0/1)  -0.6496* 
 
0.3434 
Age head 25-34 (0/1)  0.6688* 
 
0.348 
Age head 35-49 (0/1)  0.3073 
 
0.328 
Age head 50-64 (0/1)  -0.4557 
 
0.3285 
Black  (0/1) 0.0115 
 
0.3113 
Married (0/1)  0.6567** 
 
0.3329 
Less than high school (0/1) 0.5989** 
 
0.286 
High school diploma (0/1) 0.4232** 
 
0.2008 
Some college (0/1) 0.1255 
 
0.2077 
Family size  -0.0179 
 
0.0687 
Head working now (0/1)  1.06*** 
 
0.314 
North East (0/1)  -0.334 
 
0.287 
Midwest (0/1)  0.358 
 
0.219 
South (0/1)  -0.22 
 
0.228 
Largest city 500,000 or more (0/1)  -0.2359 
 
0.2706 
Largest city 100,000-499,999 (0/1)  0.0313 
 
0.1917 
Whether Original mortgage (0/1) 0.0535 
 
0.1646 
Year of mortgage origination  -0.00024 
 
0.000238 
Area not in Case-Shiller (0/1)   -0.1956 
 
0.3098 
Case-Shiller 07-09 decline >=15% but < 35% (0/1) -0.5264 
 
0.4007 
Case-Shiller 07-09 decline >=35% (0/1) 1.1858*** 
 
0.3368 
Housing payment ratio   4.7299*** 
 
0.5104 
Summary statistics  
   N :  2546 
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                                                                                         Table 8  
                                  Logistic Regression Coefficients on Mortgage Distress Measures: 
                                                Price Declines and Housing Payments/Income        
                          
 Outside Case-Shiller Case-Shiller 15-34% Case-Shiller > 35% Housing Pay Ratio 
Recent Foreclosure       2.505  (1.748)      2.693 (1.798)    1.930 (1.762)    3.879 (0.989)*** 
       0.801 (1.147)      1.387 (1.231)    0.474 (1.246)    
Mortgage Modified      -0.252 (0.245)      -0 .504 (0.311)    0 .226  (0.283)    2.881 (0.400)*** 
      -0.384 (0.227)*        -.286 (0.283)    0.444 (0.257)*  
Have Fallen Behind        1.10 (0.491)        0.276 (0.602)   1.204  (0.522)**  2.998 (0.5230)*** 
        0.910 (0.459)        0.539 (0.554)   1.234  (0.490)**  
Expect Fall Behind       0.130 (0.257)              -0.049 (0.313)    0 .289  (0.295)   3.110 (0.376)*** 
      -0.018 (0.237)        0.080 (0.291)    0.573 (.267) **  
‘Under Water’      -0.196 (0.310)        -0.526 (0.401)   1.186  (0.337)***   4.730 (0.510)*** 
      -0.526 (0.257)**        -0.466 (0.341)        0.923  (0.281)***  
 
 
V. Outcomes and Intergenerational Connections - Discussion 
     
         We can clearly see the patterns describing those who fell into mortgage distress of various forms. 
In Tables 3–7 the younger age groups are the ones more likely to have mortgage difficulties as are those 
with less education. African-American families are also more like to have experienced distress in some 
form.    With the exception of the small set of cases actually in recent foreclosure, in the Logistic models 
set out in Tables 3–7 the baseline model which included all but the housing payments ratio showed a 
substantial effect of being in a Case-Shiller city with a house price decline of 35 percent or more. When 
the measure of house payments to family income was added to the model, the effect of the Case-Shiller 
housing price decline variables was generally reduced.  This is summarized in Table 8. In all the models 
which include the Housing Payment Ratio as of 2007, there are strong effects toward a greater risk of 
foreclosure and other mortgage distress measures. The strong connection of the high cash service 
burden on housing can inform future assessments of rising risk in residential housing. Committing a high 
23 
share of income to housing is an indication that the family expects a price rise to reward their current 
payment burden. This was often not borne out. 
 
      Having documented the changing patterns and price risk position for each age group, and the factors 
shaping mortgage distress as of 2009, we explored the correlation across the intergenerational pairs 
reported in Table 2.  We know there is an IG correlation in home ownerships (O), so the both own cell 
(O-O) along with the both rent (R-R) represent most of the cases. The main interest is in the O-O, R-O, 
and O-R groups, and the most important to study of the three is the O-O group. Here we explored the 
extent to which the different risk measures (HPI, NTM, CSI categories, and financial net worth) are 
positively or negatively correlated for owners across the generations. The preliminary findings suggest 
potential resources for intra-family assistance. Namely, the co-variation in risky outcomes as of 2009 
was quite low. 
  
    Future work with these data from PSID and the Health and Retirement Study will provide additional 
insight on the intergenerational connection. For now one can see a number of important patterns – all 
the adverse outcomes were inversely related to the reported overall life satisfaction of the respondent 
in 2009 and over 16 percent of the sample holding a mortgage anticipated difficulties making mortgage 
payments in late 2009–2010. Whether or not these expectations were borne out, future waves of PSID 
data will allow an assessment of the extent to which these expectations influenced family consumption 
and savings behavior. Other factors to be studied include the impact of mortgage distress on financing 
college costs9
 
, 2009 and forward. 
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Appendix on Pre-Crisis Patterns 
 




























Table A1. The Rise of Persistent Home Ownership, 1999-2005 
1989 - 1995 -- All Respondents Ages 30-60 
 Don't Own 1989 Own 1989 Total 
Don't Own 1995 25.66% 4.74% 30.40% 
Own 1995 10.74% 58.86% 69.60% 
Total 36.40% 63.60% 100% 
 
1999 - 2005 -- All Respondents Ages 30-60 
 Don't Own 1999 Own 1999 Total 
Don't Own 2005 22.39% 5.07% 27.47% 
Own 2005 10.81% 61.72% 72.53% 
Total 33.20% 66.80% 100% 
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1989 - 1995 -- Black Respondents Ages 30-60 
 Don't Own 1989 Own 1989 Total 
Don't Own 1995 47.64% 4.19% 51.83% 
Own 1995 10.99% 37.17% 48.17% 
Total 58.64% 41.36% 100% 
 
1999 - 2005 -- Black Respondents Ages 30-60 
 Don't Own 1999 Own 1999 Total 
Don't Own 2005 39.03% 6.42% 45.45% 
Own 2005 12.14% 42.41% 54.55% 
Total 51.17% 48.83% 100% 
 
Table A2. Home Equity and Children’s College Enrollment 










Enrolled in College 43 120 79 50 28 
Total TA05 with PCG Own 85 205 112 63 32 
Weighted Percentage 50.6% 58.5% 70.5% 79.4% 87.5% 
Note: parents are renter % in college = 32.6% Source PSID, Transition to Adulthood, 2007. 
